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and currently suggests that these controls are a legitimate tool under certain circumstances, and may be introduced when a country faces a surge in net capital inflows, even after taking into account multilateral considerations (IMF, 2012) . Some
EMEs have increasingly resorted to and tightened their CBMs, especially to manage capital inflows (de Crescenzio et al., 2015) .
In the run up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 many emerging market economies, including Poland, were affected by considerable capital inflows which were difficult to absorb by their financial systems. The inflow of capital to Poland was channelled through the banking system and contributed to a significant expansion of credit, mainly mortgages, and caused an increase in real estate prices. As a result, large scale of capital inflows created a boom in the real estate market and the entire economy.
Capital flows from western European banks were a main driver of the credit and demand boom in Poland. Western European banks financed much of the credit increase through loans, deposits, and capital provided to their local subsidiaries (Kabza, 2014) .
One of a number of policy options to respond to such inflows are currency-based measures 1 directed at banks that are, in principle, motivated by macro-prudential 5 concerns. These measures are bank regulations that apply a discrimination on the basis of the currency of an operation, typically foreign currencies.
The increased use of macro-prudential and capital flow management measures in the aftermath of the crisis has started a new thread in the literature that aims at assessing the impact of such policy tools on a range of economic variables, such as capital flows, credit growth, asset prices, output growth as well as categorising information on these regulations.
Currency-based measures encompass a broad category of measures. In the paper we define them after de Crescenzio et al. (2015) as regulations imposing a different treatment between domestic and FX-denominated operations by banks. This treatment is generally less favourable for operations in foreign currencies, compared to domestic currency-denominated ones. CBMs may be addressed at operations amongst residents, or at operations between residents and non-residents. Within this broad category, a sub-set of CMBs has the character of capital flow management measures (CFMs) 2 , for example when these measures target operations abroad with non-residents. Also, among currency-based CFMs, those restrictions that apply to operations with non-residents only (discriminate on the basis of residency)
are defined as traditional capital controls 3 .
2 CFMs encompass a broad range of administrative, tax, and prudential measures that are designed to influence capital flows. They can be grouped into residency based CFMs and other CFMs. Residencybased CFMs include a variety of measures affecting cross-border financial activity that discriminate on the basis of residency -often referred to as capital controls. Examples of residency-based CFMs include for example taxes on flows from non-residents or unremunerated reserve requirements on such flows. Other CFMs are measures that do not discriminate on the basis of residency, but are nonetheless designed to influence capital inflows. This category would typically include a subset of prudential measures differentiating transactions on the basis of currency, such as limits on foreign currency borrowing and currency specific reserve requirements, and other measures typically applied to the nonfinancial sector, such as minimum holding periods and taxes on certain investments -IMF (2012a). 3 As noted by the IMF discrimination is considered to occur when "(i) a measure explicitly differentiates on the basis of residency (of either the parties or assets involved), (ii) this differentiation treats nonresident transactions less favorably, and (iii) the less favorable treatment is not justified by relevant inherent differences in the non-resident transactions. The criterion in (iii) is a narrow concept that provides flexibility to differentiate between resident and non-resident transactions only where this is necessary to put the two sets of transactions on an equal footing." -IMF (2011).
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There are two main objectives that currency-based measures could pursue. The first is exchange rate management: currency-based measures have been held out as a mechanism for avoiding overheating of the economy and excessive exchange rate appreciation associated with surges in net capital inflows (Pradhan et al., 2011) .
A second possible use of this measure is as a tool for macroprudential policy, i.e., systemic risk mitigation.
There are examples of cases where CBMs could be useful from a macroprudential perspective. First, when excessive foreign inflows pose a risk of creating domestic imbalances that cannot be directly addressed through domestic prudential regulation (for example, loan-to-value ratios or capital buffers at financial institutions), since the flows are not directly intermediated through the domestic financial system. In this case, it is proposed that controls on cross-border transactions may be useful (Ostry et al., 2012) . A second example where CBMs may be useful from a macroprudential perspective relates to foreign (and/or foreign currency) borrowing in EMEs (Pandey et al., 2015) . It has been indicated in the literature that, for EMEs, excessive foreign currency borrowing can lead to future financial crashes and generate suboptimal outcomes from a systemic risk perspective (Goldstein et al., 2004; Eichengreen et al., 2007) . Given the evidence linking external debt, especially in foreign currencies, to financial fragility, currency-based measures (particularly on foreign borrowing) could be justified as a tool for macroprudential management.
Particularly, these measures could allow the authorities to influence the level of short-term foreign currency borrowing, high levels of which have been associated with past EME crises (Pandey et al., 2015) . Pasricha et al. (2015) analyse domestic and multilateral effects of capital controls and currency-based prudential measures before and after the global financial crisis (GFC) in 17 major emerging market economies (EMEs) over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] 
Capital inflows to Poland and their consequences
After 2004, countries that were new members of the European Union -including Poland -experienced a rapid increase in debt in the non-financial sector. The strong increase in the level of credit is one of the basic elements of the process of catching up in economic development, because it involves the development of financial market within the household sector. It can also be a risk factor for the macroeconomic and financial development of individual economies due to excessive household debt -especially in foreign currency -and thus increases their vulnerability to financial crises.
9 Resolution on the scope and detailed procedures for determining capital requirements for particular risks and application of statistical methods and conditions that allows to obtain permission for their use, method and detailed rules for calculating the bank's solvency ratio, the scope and manner of accounting for banks' activities in groups in calculating capital requirements and capital adequacy ratio as well as establishing additional items of bank balance sheets included in equity in calculation of capital adequacy and scope, method and conditions of their determination. 10 Including financing of foreign currency loans.
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The inflow of capital was channelled through the banking system and contributed to a significant expansion of credit, chiefly mortgages, and caused an increase in real estate prices. As a result, large scale of capital inflow (see Figure 1 ) created a boom in the real estate market and the entire economy. Moreover, in contrast to foreign direct investment, capital inflows have not contributed to the growth of productive capital, as foreign funds were used mainly in the real estate sector. The influx of capital has also contributed to the growth of external debt and the growing dependence on foreign financing. The inflow of capital was channelled through the banking system and contributed to a significant expansion of credit, chiefly mortgages, and caused an increase in real estate prices. As a result, large scale of capital inflow (see Figure 1 ) created a boom in the real estate market and the entire economy. Moreover, in contrast to foreign direct investment, capital inflows have not contributed to the growth of productive capital, as foreign funds were used mainly in the real estate sector. The influx of capital has also contributed to the growth of external debt and the growing dependence on foreign financing. The inflow of capital was channelled through the banking system and contributed to a significant expansion of credit, chiefly mortgages, and caused an increase in real estate prices. As a result, large scale of capital inflow (see Figure 1 ) created a boom in the real estate market and the entire economy. Moreover, in contrast to foreign direct investment, capital inflows have not contributed to the growth of productive capital, as foreign funds were used mainly in the real estate sector. The influx of capital has also contributed to the growth of external debt and the growing dependence on foreign financing. The bank loan portfolio structure leaned much towards lending to households, in particular towards mortgage lending. Foreign currency (FX) mortgage loans, mostly denominated in Swiss francs, became very popular in Poland before the crisis (see Figure 3 ). These loans were attractive for borrowers because they induced lower interest rates than domestic currency loans. The interest rate difference between loans in zloty and in foreign currencies (mainly CHF) was often used by banks to sell the loans in spite of the fact that they were exposing households to risky FX positions -for banks they were profitable because of additional revenues related to foreign exchange rate operations and high commissions. FX mortgage loans were cheaper as long as the exchange rate remained stable or appreciated-an expectation that was widely held at the time (both by borrowers and credit providers) (Kabza, 2014) . Furthermore, ultimate borrower (a household) contracted FX debt but its income was in local currency, so the borrower was unhedged and this created credit risk. The flow of FX lending introduced also a significant disturbance into monetary policy transmission mechanism, since tightening of domestic monetary policy induced borrowers to substitute domestic currency loans for FX loans, rather than reducing the pace of lending activity (Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2010) . It also contributed to the increase in foreign currency lending.
12 Before the Lehman Brothers' failure, the additional cost in the form of the basis swap spread was close to zero (Bierut et al., 2015) . 13 Both FX and local currency loans in Poland have predominantly fully floating interest rates, set as the relevant interbank rate plus a fixed margin. Therefore banks were unable to pass these costs through to existing customers.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRUDENTIAL MEASURES IN DEALING WITH CAPITAL INFLOWS TO POLAND
The eradication of FX mortgage lending was possible due to supervisory actions 14 and other factors that reduced bank incentives to supply such products. The Polish Unfortunately, in subsequent periods, the provision of foreign currency loans 14 Different options for tackling the problem of FX mortgage loans were considered -for example, higher loan provisioning requirements were not introduced due to a conflict with the relevant provisions of IFRS/IAS. An outright legal ban on FX loans was also considered, but not implemented because it required being introduced through a parliamentary act. Additional capital requirements did not seem to be effective given significant surpluses in banks' regulatory capital. In general, the effectiveness of prudential measures could also be undermined by opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the extension of FX loans by branches of credit institutions from other EU countries and/or cross-border lending. The principle of free flow of capital in the EU made it difficult to block these arbitrage channels.
-see Bierut et al., 2015. 15 Before that, in 2005, the Commission increased the risk weight on housing loans with loan-to-value ratios exceeding 50 percent to 100 percent (from 50 percent previously). the risk weight for housing loans in zloty was lowered from 50% to 35%. The potential for policy leakages was a key driver behind the gradual tightening of the regulation. The step-by-step approach allowed the authorities to observe the effects of past policy actions and to respond accordingly. Policy leakages were perceived as a real threat due to the lack of any obligation on the part of home authorities to cooperate in preventing regulatory arbitrage 18 . 16 This helped banks to withstand liquidity stress in 2008-09. The purpose of introducing liquidity limits was both micro-and macro-prudential, as they underlined the need for stable and sustainable funding of banks' credit portfolios. 17 The standard 100% risk weight was applied to the rest of the loans. 18 The experience of countries which introduced strict prudential tools to strive FX lending, only to see them being circumvented by banks with the help of their foreign parent companies, provided a stark example of the potential for regulatory arbitrage. -Bierut et al., 2015. The intensification of the financial crisis in 2008 put an end to the fast credit expansion in Poland as banks tightened lending standards and consumer confidence worsened 19 . The Polish zloty depreciated by 30-40% with respect to major currencies, increasing the burden for borrowers with debts denominated in foreign currency.
However, the quality of foreign currency mortgages did not worsen significantly owing to more stringent requirements for the assessment of borrower creditworthiness provided for by Recommendation S and a decrease in Swiss interest rates, which translated directly into lower debt service costs given the fully floating nature of mortgage interest rates.
Since the financial crisis, the rate of growth of mortgages in foreign currency has After an initial strong tightening of lending policies in reaction to the GFC and an economic slowdown, banks again increased the supply of FX-denominated loans towards the end of 2009 and in 2010, but on a smaller scale than before the crisis. The other difference was that, in the case of FX mortgages, banks offered mainly euro-denominated loans instead of CHF loans, which dominated before the crisis. 20 In line with the amendment to Recommendation T, explicit DTI caps for mortgage borrowers were lifted and banks were obliged to establish their own DTI limits, which the PFSA was (and still is) able to challenge as part of the regular supervisory process.
home authorities where necessary, to persuade banks to end FX mortgage lending, which was achieved by mid-2012.
In an effort to counteract foreign currency risks, Recommendation S was again 
Methodology
In order to create an adequate measure of imposed currency-based measures we follow the methodology proposed by Pasricha et al. (2015) . In this paper, we count policy changes and then weight them by the share of the country's total international assets or liabilities that the measure is, in our opinion, designed to influence. That approach allows us to distinguish between measures which influence very significant portions of capital flows and negligible ones. As in Pasricha et al. (2015) the data for the weights are from the updated and extended Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) database 22 . However, when it comes to measuring capital inflows to Poland we propose a new approach, which in our opinion better reflects the phenomenon.
In order to capture the capital inflows from assets of the balance of payments and liabilities within the financial sector we construct the variable "capital inflows 
VAR model measuring the effectiveness of CBMs changes
In order to study the effectiveness of currency-based measures we construct a VAR (Vector Auto Regressive) model which contains variables of interest described above, exchange rate of the Polish zloty against euro, as well as exogenous variables aiming to control for their possible effects. In the baseline specification of our model we assume that the data generating process can be approximated with a following VAR model of order p:
23 In our analysis we use following categories of the Financial account of the balance of payments: Portfolio investments (debt and equity, excluding transactions of the National Bank of Poland, Government transactions and Other Monetary Financial institutions), Other investments (excluding Trade credits and SDRs Allocation). In the robustness check we also analyze similarly constructed variable, however only for the category "other financial corporations".
(1)
Where yt is a (k x r) vector of endogenous variables, xt is a (m x 1) vector of exogenous variables and matrices A and B are (k x k ) and (m x m) matrices of coefficients.
Similarly to Pasricha et al. (2015) 
Robustness check
In this section we estimate similar specifications of the model and check whether results of our analysis change drastically. The main change in "Alternative specification 1" is the use of different construction of the variable describing capital inflows. In that specification we construct the variable similarly to the "base model" (see equation 1), however we include only capital flows for "other financial corporations". Moreover, in this specification the set of three exogenous variables which maximizes the log likelihood function is different 25 . Impulse response functions are generated using Cholesky decomposition and the "Inflow" variable is 25 The set of variables can be inferred from the Table 2 showing estimation of parameters of the model.
ordered first. Figure 5 shows impulse response functions for the model in "Alternative specification 1" and estimations of the model parameters are reported in Table 2 in Appendix 1. Similarly to the "base model" the statistically significant decrease of capital inflows can be observed one quarter after the currency-based measure becomes effective. In "Alternative specification 2" we modify the "base model" by using an unweighted "CBM" measure, where all reported CBMs are equally weighted. Figure 6 shows Cholesky decomposition of the VAR model in "Alternative specification 2" and Table   3 2. "Alternative specification 1" 3. "Alternative specification 2" 
